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Essays

Dealing with Sovereign Liquidity Crises: New International
Initiatives for the New World of Volatile Capital Flows To and
From Emerging Markets*
Cynthia C. Lichtenstein*

The author of this paper accepted an invitation to speak on the topic of

emerging market banking crises in the summer of 1997, just as the Asian financial
crisis flood started with the small stream of an announcement by the Thai

authorities that after "a series of increasingly serious attacks on the baht,"' they
were introducing a managed float of the Thai currency, the baht (in effect, a
devaluation).' By August 20th, the International Monetary Fund ("Fund"), the
international organization created in 1944 at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to
be the overseer of the internationally agreed-upon rules for nations to follow in their
conduct of monetary policy and to administer a pool of currencies to be lent to
members undergoing exchange crises,3 was announcing the approval of a "stand-by

credit" of $3.9 billion for Thailand, essentially a promise that the Fund would, if
Thailand followed the economic program it and the Fund had agreed upon, lend it
over the course of the next 34 months U.S. $3.9 billion, with $1.6 billion being
available immediately.4 By October when the talk was given, the intervention of
This paper was originally given as a talk entitled "Dealing with Emerging Market Banking Crises: Is an
*
International Banking Standard an Answer?" in the McGeorge Distinguished Speakers Series 1997-1998. 1am most
grateful to the McGeorge Faculty Committee on Research Development of the McGeorge School of Law, its Chair,
Michael Vitiello, and particularly Professor Michael Malloy for inviting me to begin digging into this topic before the
subject matter became so pressing with the East Asian financial crisis we are seeing as the paper is being prepared
for publication. Iam also grateful to the faculty of the McGeorge School of Law for asking me hard questions at the
Faculty Colloquium.
** Professor of Law, Boston College Law School, A.B. Radcliffe College, J.D. Yale Law School, M. Comp.
L. University of Chicago Law School. I thank, with great admiration for her research skills and above all, her cheerful
willingness to tackle any and all tasks immediately, my research assistant 1997-98, Jennifer Mencken, J.D. 1998,
Boston College Law School.
1.
IMF Approves Stand-by Creditfor Thailand, IMF Press Release No. 97/37 (visited Aug. 20, 1997)
<http:llwww.imf.orglexternallnp/sec/pr/1997/pr9737.htm> [hereinafter IMF Press Release No. 97/37].
2.
Id.
3.
It is not possible in an essay of this length to encapsulate the entire history of the treaty signed in 1944
at Bretton Woods, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2
U.N.T.S. 39 (1945), as amended by 20 U.S.T. 2775, T.I.A.S. No. 6748 (1968), 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937
(1976) and T.I.A.S. No. 11898 (1990) [hereinafter The Fund Agreement] or indeed even to write a lexicon of the
terms current in international monetary law (such as "stand-by credit" or even "attacks on the baht"). For an attempt
to translate some of these terms into non-specialist English, see Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, The Mexican Crisis: Who
Should be a Country's Lender of Last Resort?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1769 (1995). Suffice it to say that both the
Fund Agreement and the rules are in need of serious overhaul, but at the time of this writing, all immediate attention
of both the international financial organizations and the industrial countries' financial policy makers is going to dealing
with the East Asian crisis.
4.
IMF Press Release No. 97/37, supra note 1.
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the Fund in the crisis and the announcement by the U.S. that the administration's
access to the Exchange Stabilization Fund would constitute a "secondary line of
defense" had not been effective and Indonesia and Malaysia were experiencing the
collapse of their nascent stock exchanges and, even more significantly for their
economies, the extreme depreciation of their currencies.'
By December 1997, the contagion had spread north from East Asia to South
Korea and that nation faced the possibility of being unable to pay its short-term
debts coming due at the end of December,6 this despite the announcement of a $57
billion bailout agreement coordinated by the IMF.VThe Korean Development Bank
had delayed the sale of $2 billion of bonds, planned as a means of paying these
debts, because of dissatisfaction with the interest rate its advisors said would be
necessary to place the issue-an interest rate described in the story as- "usually
associated with the sale of risky, speculative-grade 'junk bonds."' The journalists
writing the story abandoned journalistic decorum to remark: "That was evidently
too onerous or embarrassing for the influential bank to stomach."' The stream of the
Thai baht's problem had become a major flood of an Asian financial crisis whose
ultimate inundations could not be predicted.'
The financial world's leaders, public (Ministers of Finance, central bank
governors) and private (leading figures in international banks, investment houses,
and all other entities whose profits depend on international financial services),
gathered in Davos, Switzerland for the privately organized World Economic Forum
in February 1998 and the International Herald Tribune's report on the meetings is
headlined: Asia's Uncharted Economic Waters: World Leaders Don't Yet Have
0 The situation was and is all the more
a Planfor Getting Through the Crisis.1
startling in that before the Thai devaluation in July, the Asian so-called "tigers"
were considered exemplars of what liberalized (in terms of privatization of
enterprise, removal of capital controls, not in terms of permitting access for foreign
goods and services) emerging market economies could achieve of rapid economic
growth.' The "tigers," while insisting on "Asian" values' contribution to their
growth rates, had all followed the Western international economic institutions'
prescriptions for emerging market growth, including the opening of their capital
5.
Seth Mydans, Idonesia Asks LM.E and World Batik Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1997. at D2.
6.
Timothy L O'Brien & Andrew Pollack. Korea Situation Deteriorates,Raising Spector of a Default, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 1997, at Al.
7.
The Country That Invested Its Way bIto Trouble.FIN. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1998, at 6; Sheryl WuDunn, Japan
Presses Banks to Give Koreans Tmne, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1997, at D2.
8.
O'Brien & Pollack, supra note 6. at Al.
9.
For a detailed chronology of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and January 1998, see Asia: Chronology
of the Asian FinancialCrisis,AAP Newsfeed, Feb. 2, 1998, availablein LEXIS, News Library. AAP Newsfeed File,
10. See Jonathan Gage & Alan Friedman, Asia's Uncharted Economic Waters: World Leaders Don't Yet
Have a Planfor Getting Through the Crisis, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 2, 1998. at I ("We are in uncharted waters,"
said Stuart Eizenstat, the U.S. Undersecretary for Economic Affairs. "There is no ready solution.").
11. Nicholas D. Kristof, Seoul, Reluctantl), Asks IMFfor FinancialAid; CrisisShakes Faith in the "Asian
Miracle," INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 22, 1997. at 1.
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markets to foreign portfolio investment and allowing their industrial and financial
entities to borrow abroad, 12 both from financial intermediaries (banks and

investment banking houses that have moved into commercial bank territory by
direct extensions of credit, if only by acting as counterparties on derivatives) and

by the issuance of debt obligations on foreign capital markets. The Mexican peso
crisis at the end of 1994 had certainly served as a warning of what could happen
with open capital markets 3 and over reliance by emerging economies on what the
Fund calls, in its amendment to its Principles of Surveillance made in its
post-Mexican crisis review of the Principles, "unsustainable flows of private
capital."'14 Unfortunately, but rather predictably, since the Fund essentially was
unable to give content to the term "unsustainable" (although it does seem to have
tried to suggest to the Thais and the other Asian countries that a storm might be
brewing,' 5 but without preventive effect since no one yet seems to have agreed on
just how a warned country should get down to a storm cellar) and the international
12. For a description of the efforts of the Fund and the World Bank to bolster capital market access for
developing countries on the theory that access to capital markets is a desirable source of hard currencies for newly
industrialized countries, see Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, The New FinancialWorld of CrossBorder CapitalMovements;
The InternationalMonetary Fund Agreement in the Light of the 1994 Mexico Peso Crisis,in WEBER. (HRSG.)
WAHRUNG UND WIRTSCHAFT, DAS GELD iMRECHT, FESTSCHRIFT FOR PROFESSOR DR. HUGO J.HAHN, NOMOS
VERLAGSGESELLSCHAFT 191 (1997). For a fascinating description of how pre-peso crisis Mexican officials
conducted what are called in the investment banking business "roadshows" (public presentations by the securities
issuer and its investment bankers to help "place" the securities) to flog their obligations, that is, getting capital
Mexico, in FROM HALIFAX TO
inflows, see Arminio Fraga, Crisis Prevention and Managentent: Lessons frora
LYONS: WHAT HAS BEEN DONE ABOUT CRISIS MANAGEMENT?, ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, No. 200,46
(Peter B. Kenen ed. 1996).
13. The post Mexican crisis literature is voluminous. For a good collection of the materials in legal journals,
see Francois Gianviti, The IMFand the Liberalizationof CapitalMarkets, 19 HOUS.J. INT'L L. 773 (1997). Gianviti
is prophetic when he concludes his article, written before the Thai devaluation, by saying, "Inevitably, as the trend
toward liberalization of capital movements continues and as the prevention of crises will not necessarily be achieved,
other debt crises will occur." Id. at 783.
The economic literature abounds with specific warnings. Typical is the Introductionby Lawrence Summers,
Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, to FROM HALIFAX TO LYONS: WHAT HAS BEEN DONE ABOUT CRISIS
MANAGEMENT?, supranote 12, at 1,in referring to "the most challenging problem facing the international financial
system-the risk that a country experiencing large capital inflows will have suddenly to cope with large outflows
when market participants revise their views about the country's prospects." Id. Or consider the view of another set
of contributors to From Halifax to Lyons, supra note 12, Barry Eichengreen & Richard Portes, Managing the Next
Mexico, in FROM HALIFAX TO LYONS: WHAT HAS BEEN DONE ABOUT CRISIS MANAGEMENT?, ESSAYS IN

INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, No. 200, 26, 33-34 (Peter B. Kenen ed. 1996):
Unlike the direct foreign investments that had dominated the industrial countries' private investment in
the developing world for much of the postwar period and the bank loans that had provided the vehicle for
capital transfer in the 1970s, these stocks and bonds were highly liquid; they could be sold as easily as
they had been purchased. Capital flows could now turn on a dime.
The author makes the same point in The New FinancialWorld of Cross Border Capital Movements, supra note 12,
at 192-93, distinguishing between direct foreign investment and portfolio investment, often flowing in through the
intermediation of institutional investors such as global mutual funds and pension funds.
14. Lichtenstein, supra note 12, at 196 & nn. 22-24. For a good bibliography of the literature on Fund
surveillance, see C. FRED BEROSTEN & C. RANDALL HENNING, GLOBAL ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP AND THE GROUP

OF SEVEN 91 n.l I (Institute for Int'l Economics 1996).
15. See Stanley Fischer, The Asian Crisis: A View from the IMF, Address at the Midwinter Conference of
the Bankers' Association for Foreign Trade, Washington, D.C., (Jan. 22, 1998) (transcript available as Stanley
Fischer, The Asian Crisis: View from the IMF (visited June 30, 1998) <http://www.imf.orgfexternallpubs/
ft/survey/pdf/01 2698.pdf>).
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community had not by the summer of 1998 concurred in any effective way on
methods of prevention of such crises, the Asian crisis has struck the interconnected

financial system. As noted above, at this moment, no solution is in sight.
Fortunately for the international financial system, at the moment of this writing
the Asian "flu" does not seem to be very "contagious."' 6 Like the term
"unsustainable capital inflows," the term "contagious" seems to have an indefinite
content. Like so much else in any discussion of sovereign liquidity crisis, there is
17
considerable disagreement as to whether "contagion" actually exists.
Nevertheless, "[t]he fear of contagion is a primary motive in the policy search for

a post-Mexico strategy in sovereign financial crises."' 8 It was the fear of contagion
from future such crises that in part motivated the economic summit group of the

industrialized western nations (the so-called G-7) at their meeting in Halifax in
June 1995 to invite the slightly larger Group of Ten (G-10) to set up a Working
Party to prepare a report on what the Executive Summary of the report, The
Resolution of Sovereign Liquidity Crises calls "the complex set of issues arising
with respect to the orderly resolution of sovereign liquidity crises."' 9 Note the word

"resolution." What the Working Party focused on was how countries in crisis might
be helped to get well before their flu infected others. It considered such issues as
"temporary suspension of payments, IMF lending policies and, while rejecting the
notion as neither 'feasible' nor 'appropriate,' international bankruptcy
procedures. 20 Once again, there was no international agreement on appropriate
resolution procedures 2' and thus no "solution" in sight for the Asian crisis. 22 Once

again we are treated to the unedifying sight of academics criticizing the Fund's
approach,'

academics differing not only in academic debate, as is fruitful, but

16. The Financial Times wrote:
But the crisis now appears to have been contained. South Korea and Thailand, (and, until recently,
Indonesia) are implementing sensible policies and are being rewarded by stability in their financial
markets. Vulnerable countries such as Hong Kong, Brazil and Russia, have escaped contagion from Asia,
A global slump looks highly improbable.
Welconte to the Party, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1998, at 10.
17. See, e.g., William R. Cline, Crisis Management in Enteigbig Capital Markets 7. in FROM HALIFAX TO
LYONS: WHAT HAS BEEN DONE ABOUT CRISIS MANAGEMENT?, supra note 12. Cline. in this essay, is unconvinced
about the risks of contagion and is skeptical that any future such crises will pose a systemic risk. Id. at 20. But see
BERGSTEN & HENNING, supra note 14. at 99 ("The Mexico Crisis of late 1994-95 demonstrated that financial
disruption in any one region can have pervasive 'contagion effects' around the world.").
18. Cline, supra note 17, at 13.
19. Group of Ten, The Resolution of Sovereign Liquidity Crises: A Report to the Ministers and Governors
Prepared Under the Auspices of the Deputies, May 1996, at I (report available as Group of Ten. The Resohtion
of Sovereign Liquidity Crises: A Report to the Ministers and Governors Prepared Under the Auspices of the
Deputies (visited June 30, 1998) <http'/www.bis.org/publ/gtenO3.pdf>) (copy on file with McGeorge Law Review).
20. Id. at ii.
21. The essays in FROM HALIFAXTO LYONS: WIIAT HAS BEEN DONE ABOUT CRISIS MANAGEMENT?,supra
note 12, are in large part detailed critiques of the Report.
22. Gage & Friedman. supra note 10, at 1.
23. Michael Richardson. Q & A/Jeffrey Sachs, IMF Prescribes "Wrong Medicine," INT'L HERALD TRIll.,
Jan. 15. 1998, at 17.
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widely in policy prescriptions, therefore making an international consensus more

difficult,24 and finally to viewing the growth of a coalition in the United States

Congress which could possibly block the U.S. from adding additional funding to
the Fund to help meet future crises. The coalition is between those "free-market
Republicans who dislike bail-outs on principle to left-leaning Democrats who think
saving Asia will put American jobs at risk."'
Yet with all the disagreement, and with all the lack of consensus on resolution
of such crises, there seems to be considerable agreement on one point and complete

agreement on a second. The first point is that the reinstitution of capital controls for
countries facing an exchange crisis resulting from volatile outflows is not a

solution.26 With the integration of international capital markets, any emerging

market economy will need access to those markets as part of its growth strategy.

Whatever the architects of the Bretton Woods system may have envisioned for its
members' capital accounts, in putting capital controls outside of the agreed upon
rules of the Fund Agreement 27 and providing in Article VI, Capital Transfers,
section l(a) that in the event of a large or sustained outflow of capital, the Fund
may request a member to exercise controls, the present thinking accepts that access

24. See Peter Passell, IMF: Caught in Middle of Asia Blame Game, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 16, 1998, at
11 (describing the differing views of Joseph Stiglitz, chief economist at The World Bank. and Rudi Dornbusch at
MIT).
25. Lex, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1998, at 20.
26. After the Asian crisis was quite visible, the Managing Director of the Fund, Michel Camdessus, in his
closing speech to the Fund and World Bank Annual meetings on September 25, 1997 stated firmly that the way to
deal with volatile capital flows is not to restrict capital markets but to try to make them work better. 26 IMF SURV.
290 (Oct. 6, 1997). One set of commentators, Robert Wade and Frank Veneroso in a 1998 piece entitled The Asian
Crisis: The High Debt Model vs. The Wall Street-Treasury-IMF Complex. (Mar. 1998) (available as Robert Wade
and Frank Veneroso. The High Debt Model vs. The Wall Street-Treasnry-IMF Complex (visited June 30. 1998)
<http://epn.orglsageimf24.htnl> (copy oii file with the McGeorge Law Review)), insist that at least in Asian countries
where the usual financial structure for economic actors is highly leveraged, the capital account must remain closed.
The statement in the text should also be qualified by noting that the most recent speeches by M. Camdessus and his
First Deputy, Stanley Fischer, emphasize that emerging market countries should liberalize their capital accounts
gradually as part of restructuring programs and should keep careful track of foreign borrowing. See also Stanley
Fischer, The Asian Crisis: A View from the IMF, Address at the Midwinter Conference of the Bankers' Association
for Foreign Trade (Jan. 22, 1998) (transcript available as Stanley Fischer, The Asian Crisis: A View from the IMF
(visitedJune 30,1998) <http.lwww.imf.orglexternallpubslftlsurvey/pdf/0 12698.pdf> (copy on file withthe McGeorge
Law Reviewi)) (stating that "excessive unhedged foreign borrowing by the domestic private sector" contributed to the
crisis); Michel Camdessus. The IMF and its Programs in Asia, Remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations, (Feb.
6, 1998) (transcript available as Michel Camdessus. The IMF and its-Programs in Asia (visited June 30, 1998)
<http'J/www.imf.org/extemallnplspeechesl1998lO20698.htm> (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review))
(recommending as part of the new architecture for prevention of crisis "orderly capital account liberalization: this
means neither a return to antiquated capital controls nor a mad rush to full immediate liberalization, regardless of the
risks, but properly sequenced and cautious liberalization, so that a larger number of countries can benefit from access
to the international capital markets").
27. For a history of the drafting of Article VI. Capital Transfers, of the Fund Agreement, see Lichtenstein,
supra note 12, at 194-96.
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economy2 8
to capital markets is a necessary concomitant to a modem liberal market
29

and that access and a full blown set of controls are incompatible.

The second point on which there is full agreement is what is now accepted as

the sine qua non of prevention of currency crises in emerging market economies:
financial sector reform and the creation of a domestic banking system that adheres
to adequate (and internationally agreed upon) prudential standards and is regulated

and supervised by an independent technically adequate supervisory system.
Interestingly, not only is such financial sector reform the prescription for prevention, it is also almost universally agreed upon as the medicine for the existing
Asian crisis. This is M. Camdessus speaking in Paris of the handling by the Fund
of the Korean, Thai and Indonesian crises:
In each case [Korea, Thailand and Indonesian programs] the centerpiece of

the program is a thorough restructuring of the financial sector. The goal is
to ensure that owners and managers are genuinely more accountable for the

prudent operation of their banks, that loans are made on the basis of
role
objective commercial criteria, and that banks return to their essential
30
of mobilizing domestic savings and promoting sound investment.
Each newspaper story on the Fund programs to restabilize the countries in crisis has
stressed the Fund's insistence on bank restructuring, the closure or merging of
financial institutions that look too shaky to survive and the requirement of passage
3
of legislation to set up what is hoped to be an adequate supervisory system. 1
We have now reached the heart of this paper: the connection between domestic

bank regulatory structure and currency crises in emerging market economies. Why,
exactly, is a robust financial sector adequately supervised considered to be

protective against a run on the currency? The concept was recognized in the G-10's

28. The Fund Agreement, supra note 3, Art. VI, § l(a); Gianviti, supra note 13, at 779.
29. A few Asian leaders see this new thinking on the part of the Fund and the World Bank as simply an
indication of the extent to which both institutions are integral to Wall Street. Seth Mydans, Malaysia Takitg Pledge
Nevertheless, the same leaders do not willingly restrict borrowing
of Austeriy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1997. at D 11.
by their major corporations from the West, if Western markets will lend at favorable interest rates.
30. Michel Camdessus, The IMF and Good Governance, Address at Transparency hltentational(France),
(Jan. 21, 1998) (transcript available as Michel Camdessus, The IMF and Good Governance (visited June 30, 1998)
<http://www.imf.orglexternal/np/speechesl1998/012198.htm>).
31. E.g., Andrew Pollack. South Korea Halts ActivityAt 9 Banks. N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1997, at D1. In one
way, this prescription is quite remarkable. Volumes have been written on the Fund's "conditionality," the conditions
it imposes upon countries receiving from the Fund financial aid over and above the currencies to which a country has
access without question. Yet until recently, when the Fund began to become involved in "structural transformation"
of countries in transition from centrally planned to market economies. (see Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, Aiding The
Transformation of Economies: Is the Fnd's ConditionaliyAppropriate to the Task?, 62 FORDHAM L, REV. 1943
(1994)), the Fund was careful to aim its conditions at macroeconomic policy, governmental action that arguably was
related to exchange rate policy. Domestic bank regulatory structure in the past has been considered to be a matter
only of internal concern. Richard W. Stevenson. Greenspan Urges More Attention Be Paid to Banks Abroad, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3,1997, at D4.
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Report on the Resolution of Sovereign Liquidity Crises: the Executive Summary
of the Report notes at paragraph 7:
The Working Party recognizes that structural weaknesses in the banking
systems of debtor countries could seriously aggravate liquidity crises and
might pose difficulties for financial systems in lender countries. The
Working Party concluded that further work should be undertaken in
appropriate international forums to promote the strengthening of financial
systems in emerging market economies and thus help to reduce such risks.32
The text of the Report has a short section on "prevention" and comments:
Various committees and groupings meeting under the umbrella of the BIS
and other international organizations are developing procedures for
promoting the soundness of banks and other financial institutions and for
strengthening financial markets so that the inevitable shocks and
disruptions are not amplified and their systemic repercussions are
contained. In order to avoid unnecessary duplication of this work, the
Working Party welcomed such efforts but did not dwell on these
dimensions of crisis prevention.3 3
The subsequent summit of the G-7 at Lyons in June 1996 explored this view of the
Working Party and "called for the adoption of strong prudential standards in
emerging-market countries and urged international financial institutions and bodies
to promote the development of effective supervisory arrangements in those
countries."'
The remainder of this paper will now try to spell out the connection, describe
briefly the efforts in international fora to develop an international standard for
domestic application and, most important, to follow up on a suggestion of the
Dennis Weatherstone Senior Fellow at the Institute of International Economics,
Morris Goldstein, as to how pre-crisis emerging market economies3" can be
encouraged to adhere to any international banking standard so developed.
There are two strands as to why the strength of the domestic financial
regulatory system is key to preventing sovereign liquidity crisis. The first is the
ambiguous role of financial intermediaries in a liberalized market economy.
Privately owned financial intermediaries are like private companies in any market
system: their prime aim and their raison d'&re is to make money for their owners

32. Group of Ten, supra note 19, at iii.
33. Id. at 12.
34. Summers, supra note 13, at 6.
35. Post-crisis economies are required to restructure their financial sectors as a condition to their Fund
standbys so the question of enforcement of an international standard is less acute. See Camdessus, supra note 30.
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so that their owners will reward their managers handsomely. To make money in a
market system is to take risks: carefully calculated risks. (In the case of banks-to
oversimplify wildly-the chief risk is the various gaps between a bank's funding,
the interest rate at which it borrows, the currencies in which it borrows, the
maturities of its borrowing, and the cost of its equity-and the bank's
investments-the interest rate at which the bank lends, the currencies in which it
lends, the maturities of its lending, and the amount of capital, equity or equity-like,
it has to tide it over gaps that widen unexpectedly). In a market economy using
private entities as its pistons, the control over the degree of risk incurred in the
search for gain is the fear of failure and the owners' loss of their investment.
However, private banks perform in market economies quasi-public functions: they
are repositories for the savings of the public,6 the administrators of the payments
system and the levers by which macroeconomic monetary policy set by the
government or by the central bank, if there is one, is transmitted. Simply stated,
governments feel special constraints in allowing banks that misgauged risk to fail.
The owners and managers of private banks are aware of this privileged position of
banks and come to count on being "bailed out." And by definition the public
placing its deposits in banks (that is, funding the banks) do not exercise an
investor's discipline over the entities because the public does not have access to
sufficient information about the relative riskiness of each individual bank' sbusiness
to choose among them. And why should they in a system where the government, to
give these quasi public entities preferred access to public saving, has guaranteed
repayment of at least a portion of deposits?
This dilemma, of using privately owned entities to funnel household savings
from the public to productive enterprise and so being reluctant to let these
intermediaries fail,
is known in the literature by the funny name of the problem of
"moral hazard."37 The dilemma exists for modem industrialized economies, as
recently illustrated for the United States by the savings and loan debacle and for
Europe by the Scandinavian banking crisis, but is particularly acute in emerging
market economies that have liberalized their capital accounts and do not restrict or
at least oversee hard currency borrowings by their intermediaries. (The exact
structure of the financial sector varies from country to country; for example,
Krugman suggests that in the Thai crisis it was Thai so-called financial companies

36. Particularly inemerging market economies or economies intransition where the domestic securities market
is neither well-developed nor well-regulated for the avoidance of fraud, deposits in banks are the only way to get
household savings from under the mattresses and into the economy.
37. The economist Paul Krugman has made available on the World Wide Web his January 1998 paper, Paul
Krugman, What Happened to Asia? (visited Sept. 9, 1998) <http:llwww.mit.edulkrugmanlwww.disinter.html>, In
which he explores the contributions to the Asian currency crises of "financial intermediaries (and of the moral hazard
associated with such intermediaries when they are poorly regulated), and the prices of real assets such as capital and
land." The paper contains, in its
section on "Moral Hazard and Overinvestment," a detailed numerical example
illustrating "the logic of moral hazard for guaranteed intermediaries" which will not be repeated here.
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that played a crucial role.) 8 The financial commentator of the FinancialTimes,
Martin Wolf, published a brilliant "Comment and Analysis" entitled Why Banks
are Dangerous39 which points out that a domestic lender of last resort-the
"solution" for modern economies to banking liquidity crises--"[A central bank]
cannot be a lender of last resort in a foreign currency. Neither can its government
insure foreign currency deposits. '4 If an intermediary in an emerging market
economy borrows in a foreign currency and then lends on, either in the national
currency or in the foreign currency, so far as risk to the macroeconomy is

-concerned, it has incurred foreign exchange risk (sometimes called "transfer risk").
If it has on lent in the national currency, it (that is to say its government which has
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed its liabilities) has run the risk that its borrower

will repay in a depreciated or devalued national currency while it must repay its
hard currency borrowing in now more expensive hard currency-or use up its
government's reserves in allowing it to avoid default. If the intermediary has lent
to a domestic borrower in the foreign currency, the domestic borrower's ability to
pay both interest
and principle is severely affected by the depreciation of the local
41
currency.

38. Id.
39. Martin Wolf, Why Banks are Dangerous,FIN. TIMES, Jan. 6,1998. at 11.
40. Id.
41. Group ofTen. supranote 19, at 13, notes that sovereign liquidity crises are seriously aggravated by bank
funding of longer-term domestic lending in the wholesale interbank markets of the main international financial centers.
The Report points out that if the creditors do not roll over the interbank lending, a general domestic banking crisis
can be generated. "If the debtor country government provided extensive support for the banking sector in such
circumstances, its own financial position could deteriorate significantly." Id. Although it is too soon for the empirical
data confirming the hypothesis to have been gathered, the author suspects that the joining of the OECD by South
Korea aggravated the liabilities of the Korean banks to the wholesale interbank markets, liabilities denominated in
hard currencies, not in won. Tim Shorrock, S. KoreaJoins the Club of the Rich, J. COMMERCE, Oct. 25, 1996, at IA.
Because banks doing an international business are the indispensable underpinning for the movement of goods in
international trade through issuance or confirmation of letters of credit, ever since the Central Bank Governors of the
G-I 0 adopted a commonsystemof risk-based capital requirements for international banks subject to theirjurisdiction,
the so-called 1989 Basle Accord (see J.J. Norton, The Work of the Basle Supervisors Coumittee an Bank Capital
Adequacy and the July 1988 Report on "International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital
Standards," 23 INT'L LAW. 245 (1989); Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, Introductory Note to Bank for International
Settlements: Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices' ConsultativePaper on International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standans, 30 I.L.M. 967 (1991); see also William R. White,
InternationalAgreementsin theArea ofBankingand Finance:Accomplishmnentsand OutstandingIssues 1996 (Bank
for Int'l Settlements Working Paper No. 38, 1996) (last modified Sept. 2, 1998) <http://www.bis.org/
publ/work38.htm> (copy on file with theMcGeorge Law Review)) there has been a special capital requirement status
for interbank lending to OECD banks. What this means is that for banks subject to regulators' capital requirements
imposed by their regulatory jurisdiction in accordance with the Basle Accord, interbank lending to banks
headquartered in OECD countries is more profitable whatever is the particular market rate on the form of interbank
lending concerned. It may be assumed that the Basle Supervisors' Committee, the draftsman of the Basle Accord,
chose the OECD grouping of countries as the easiest surrogate for a listing of bank regulatory jurisdictions following
principles of comprehensive consolidated bank supervision so that it would be appropriate to require less capital
backing for interbank lending to banks in those countries. Unfortunately, so far as is known, there is no review of the
quality of prudential supervision of financial intermediaries when the members of OECD are making the decision to
add a new country member. Thus, international standards for capital charges, the Basle Accord, created a perverse
incentive to the interbank market to push hard currency funding to Korean banks even though in reality such funding
was at least as risky for the creditor banks as lending to the banks of any other emerging market economy.
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In either case, the uncovered foreign currency borrowing by the emerging
market financial intermediaries has put the country whose currency may be entering

a crisis (either because of speculative attacks on the currency or simply because
foreign portfolio investment has begun to flow out again because higher returns are
newly available elsewhere in the global capital markets 42) at risk of having to use
its foreign currency reserves to support its domestic banking system just when it
needs its reserves to support its exchange rate against the speculative attacks or the
oversupply of its currency as the foreign investors sell out and go elsewhere. 43 The

more the country has supported its domestic banking system with deposit insurance
or other guarantees explicit or implied, the more it must act as if those guarantees
will be honored to avoid adding a domestic run on financial institutions to the
sudden outflow of foreign investment. As the Financial Times puts it: "Foreign
direct investment is invaluable. But easy private-sector access to short-term
borrowing can be lethal." 4
The second strand as to why the strength of the domestic banking sector is key
to a government's capacity to deal with a currency crisis lies in an absolutely
traditional remedy for meeting capital outflows, raising the domestic interest rate,
45
thus meeting the competition from greater rates of return in other markets.

Unfortunately, this macroeconomic move puts severe pressure on weak banks trying
to roll over their funding and severe pressure on struggling corporations with

floating rate loans. Thus the robustness of the financial sector is key to the
government's most useful tool to counter the effects of the volatile capital outflows.

42. A recent leader in the Financial7imes has remarked:
A big part of the explanation [for the east Asian financial crisis] has to lie with the fickleness of external
investors, who first behaved as if east Asian economies could do nothing wrong and, shortly thereafter.
as if they could do nothing right. As the Washington-based Institute for International Finance notes, net
private flows to Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand jumped from $48 billion in 1994
to $93 billion in 1996-to collapse to an estimated ninuts S12 billion last year.
East Asian Shipwreck, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1998, at 21 (emphasis added).
43. If an emerging market currency is freely convertible for capital transfers (and this is what is meant by
"capital account liberalization" or, in other parlance, "removal of capital controls"), the country's hard currency
reserves increase as foreign investors sell their currencies to purchase securities denominated in the domestic
currency and equally, the country's supply of its own currency swells as selling investors try to exchange the domestic
currency proceeds of their sales for the hard currencies they want to invest elsewhere.
44. East Asian Shipwreck, supra note 42, at 21.
45. The Remarks by Michel Camdessus at the Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 26, stressed that the
Fund's prescription of higher interest rates in its East Asian programs wasnot to deflate the economies, but to reverse
the deep unwarranted, in the Fund's view, depreciation of the currencies.
To reverse [the depreciation], countries have to make it more attractive to hold domestic currency, and
that means temporarily raising interest rates .... This is a key lesson of the "tequila crisis" in Latin
America 1994-95, as well as from the more recent experience of Brazil, Hong Kong, and the Czech
Republic, all of which have fended off attacks on their currencies over the past few months with a timely
and forceful tightening of interest rates, along with other supporting policy measures.
Id.
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As noted above,' the Lyon G-7 Summit in June 1996 called for coordinated
international efforts to develop a set of "best practices" in the area of banking

prudential regulation and supervision. A variety of international institutions
responded, in particular the long-time locus of industrialized country banking

supervision standards, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision,47 which in
April 1997 released the preliminary version of its paper, Core Principlesfor
Effective Banking Supervision, and in September 1997 released the definitive

version which was submitted to the G-7 and G-10 Finance Ministers in preparation
for the June 1997 Denver Summit.48 Probably to avoid the charge that the
Principles only applied to banking systems in the rich capital exporting nations, the
Basle Committee prepared the document in a group containing representatives from

the Committee itself and from Chile, China, Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Mexico,
Russia and Thailand. "Nine other countries (Argentina, Brazil, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Poland and Singapore) were also closely associated
with the work."4 9 One wonders if the association turned out in the event of the crises
in Indonesia, Korea and Thailand to have been useful in the training of civil
servants familiar with the "technology," if you will, of the financial sector
restructuring demanded by the Fund programs.
It is not the intent of this paper to set out the Principles here. In general they are
completely unexceptional and quite what anyone familiar with the series of papers
the Basle Committee has produced since 1988 would expect. For a most thoughtful
analysis of both the politics and the practicalities of the production of an
"international banking standard," the reader is referred to Morris Goldstein, The
CaseforanInternationalBankingStandard,Institute for International Economics,
April 1997.50 What is interesting is the proposal of the Basle Committee that

46. See supra text accompanying note 34 (discussing the June 1996 G-7 summit).
47. See supra note 41 (discussing the Basle Accord).
48. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. Core Principlesfor Effective Banking Supervision (Sept. 1997)
(visited June 30, 1998) <http://www.bis.orgipubl/bcbs30a.pdf> (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review); also
available in 37 I.L.M. 405 (1998).
49. Id. at 1-2.
50. Goldstein also covers in the book the connections between domestic bank weakness and the difficulties
for the government concerned with handling foreign exchange crises, this before anyone predicted the East Asian
financial crisis. It should be noted that attempting to strengthen emerging market banking systems in order to bolster
financial stability in such economies is not the only theoretical approach to the problem of the integration of such
economies into the global capital markets. In a paper originally presented to the European Institute of Asian Studies
Seminar in Brussels on January 20, 1998, The Contributory Role of Banks in Financial Crises, Professor J.H.
Dalhuisen, King's College London and University of Utrecht, argues that it is not in fact possible to adequately
supervise banks so as to prevent their contributions to instability without having banking supervisors running the
whole system "which comes basically down to a nationalization of the banking industry." J. H. Dalhuisen, The Impact
of the Asian Currency Crisis on European Growth Prospects, 8 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 293 (1997). He, therefore,
proposes a so-called "narrow bank" solution for both industrialized and emerging market economies where those
semi-public institutions, providing the payments system and consumer deposits, would be limited to investment
(presumably, although in this version of his paper Dalhuisen does not specify) in domestic government securities and
all other financial sector institutions would be treated like ordinary business corporations competing for capital in
the marketplace and allowed to fail.
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implementation of the Principles will be reviewed at the International
5 Conference
of Banking Supervisors in October 1998 and biannually thereafter. '
This notion of coordinated review by an international gathering of supervisors

of the progress made by emerging market economies in implementing (and
presumably in practice adhering to) an international standard for banking regulation

and supervision is the first hint of concern for the major issue of how to achieve
compliance with an international standard when one is developed and agreed upon.

The question will be the extent to which review of implementation by supervisory
peers will be effective in shaming non-compliant countries to do better. Goldstein
makes the point that an international banking standard such as the Core Principles

"lends further credibility to banking reform efforts-much in the same way that
IMF support lends credibility to national stabilization programs." 5 2 Presumably the

approbation of one's peers at the bi-annual meetings will aid the efforts for those
countries honestly struggling to come up to the standard even if the shame does not

act as a sanction for those not in fact trying to reform. The problem, of course,
remains that at any such gathering of supervisors the reports of implementation are

generated by the supervisors concerned. The laggards are just apt to keep silent.
Before, however, turning to this issue of achieving compliance with

international norms of banking regulation with which this essay will conclude, it is
necessary to mention another international study for avoidance of financial crises
in emerging market economies, a study which in its reach went quite far beyond the
work of the Basle Committee and its associates in developing the Core Principles
for Effective Banking Supervision.53 This study, circulated originally in April
1997, 54 is a Report entitled FinancialStability in Emerging Market Economies,

51. UnlikelOSCO, the International Organization ofSecurities Commissions, whose work is discussed at infra
text accompanying notes 56-66, the International Conference of Banking Supervisors is a global group of supervisors
who, while meeting biannually since the 1970s, I believe, have never allowed access to the papers of the biannual
meetings or published communiquds. They carry on the grand tradition that the less the public knows about banks
and their supervision, the less likely the public is to create runs. Unfortunately for the tradition, the confidentiality
of all reports and supervisory discussions obviates any possibility of investors in banks exercising any leverage over
managers' prudence. If one can assume that the survey of implementation of the Core Principles will be kept equally
secret, then it is hard to see why the review will further compliance.
This is the same dilemma for the Fund concerning its surveillance and Article IV country reports.
Concerning surveillance authority, see Article 4, Section 3, Amended Articles of Agreement of the International
.Monetary Fund, published in 4 ANDREAS F.LOWENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM, at DS-86 (2d
ed. 1984). Traditionally the Fund keeps the reports secret and only releases them with the authorization ofthe member
country concerned. Such secrecy, however, means that the Fund is unable to use the private capital markets as a
source of discipline and speculative attacks thrive on rumor and insider leaks rather than accurate macroeconomic
information. Goldstein, text accompanying siupra note 50.
52. Goldstein, text accompanying supra note 50, at 32.
53. Supra text accompanying note 48.
54. Although, unlike the Core Principles, supra text accompanying note 48, the author has not seen any
document indicating that the Report of the Working Party on financial stability in emerging market economies has been
adopted or vetted by any group of officials having a hierarchical status higher than the Working Party as constituted,
this may simply reflect the fact that with the Asian crisis beginning in July 1997 with the floating of the Thai baht,
the G-7 has been absorbed with the handling of the crisis with no energy or political will left over for focusing on
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A Strategy for the Formulation, Adoption and Implementation of Sound
PrinciplesandPracticesto StrengthenFinancialSystems,5 prepared by a working
party (under the chairmanship of Mario Draghi, Chairman of the Deputies of the
Group of Ten) created in response to an initiative at the G-7 Lyon summit in June,
1996 to develop a strategy for fostering financial stability in countries experiencing
rapid economic growth and undergoing substantial changes in their financial
systems. The working party consisted of representatives of, among others, Hong
Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Thailand and the United States. Representatives of
IOSCO, The International Organization of Securities Commission, among other
international economic organizations, attended the meetings of the working party
and a collection of IOSCO's principles and past conclusions, guidelines and
recommendations (in much less comprehensive and authoritative form, it must be
admitted, than the Basle Committee's Core Principles for Effective Banking
Supervision) is attached as Annex 3 to the Report. The Report covers not only the
work of the Basle Committee and the contribution to financial stability of
transparent, fair and efficient capital markets (the aim of IOSCO's principles), but
also covers the need for high quality accounting systems, "sound and up-to-date
systems for risk management by securities firms,"" suggestions for the role of the
Fund and the World Bank and above all, the role to be played in the strategy for
stability of market discipline and market access channels. The Report is of extreme
interest and unfortunately could not have been absorbed and implemented by the
international community in time to be a prophylactic for this summer's and fall
Asian financial crisis. Events overtook the slow processes of international
cooperation. One may only speculate, however, that the adoption of the strategy by
the Working Party must have made the task of the International Monetary Fund in
insisting upon its financial reform conditions in its Thai, Indonesian and Korean
programs of aid a bit easier, in that those officials of those countries who had
participated in the Working Party were already "on board," so to speak, in
concurrence in the necessity of instituting the best practices of good governance,
supervision and regulation suggested in the Report.
It is possible to argue that with the Working Party's Report, the international
community has reached a consensus on what needs to be done by emerging market
countries to allow them both to access the international capital markets (to achieve
financial liberalization) and to withstand successfully the necessary volatility of
such inflows, to sustain and strengthen financial stability while maintaining
liberalization. The reaching of the consensus, while in no way yet formally adopted,
has been signaled by Mr. Michel Camdessus' speech on the "new architecture" at
preventive strategies. However, M. Camdessus' remarks before the Council on Foreign Relations, supra note 26,
listing six "pillars" of a "new architecture" for strengthening the international financial system, would seem to presage
a refocusing of attention on preventative efforts.
55.

REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY ON FINANCIALSTABILITY IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMI ES 5 (Apr.

1997) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY].
56. Id. at 42.
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the Council on Foreign Relations, 7 as well as by the speech given by Mr. Alan
Greenspan, Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve.58 Now the question
remains, how does the international community ensure that emerging markets do
adopt the strategy?
The norms and best practices developed by the Basle Committee and IOSCO
and the G-10 and whatever other grouping gets to work to build a consensus on
international standards are not "international law." The Report of the Working
Party on FinancialStability in EmergingMarket Economies 9 is very clear on this
point. The Report describes the consultative process by which, in the financial
arena, norms of best practice are developed and then adds:
A formal endorsement may give the recommendations greater weight.
However, they have no legal force until they are adopted by national
authorities. They derive their authority from the expertise of those that
have formulated them and their wide acceptance from the consultative
manner in which they are prepared. They come to be applied because they
reduce risk, improve market functioning and foster a level playing field. If
the conventions or norms are not observed, market participants exact a risk
6
premium. 0
How then is it possible to persuade national authorities to adopt an international
banking standard, to provide for sufficient oversight of domestic capital markets,
to ensure their transparency, fairness and efficiency, and to force domestic
corporations to adhere to norms of good governance?
When the financial crisis has actually arrived, when the local stock market has
plunged, the local currency has plummeted and the country is reaching the end of
its reserves, then the international community has a method of insisting upon the
adoption of the norms of financial structural reform, banking supervision and
securities market oversight. The country, having by definition lost access to the
capital markets, unable to pay its debts, turns to the Fund and the G-7 countries for
aid and the Fund imposes, as a condition of the extension of its credit, the reforms
the community has now agreed upon as the necessary concomitant of the return to
financial health. 6 '

57.
58.
59.

Supra note 26 and accompanying text.
Fed Chief Calls For Shake-Up Of Global Financial System. FIN. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1998. at 1.
Supra note 55.

60.

REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY, supra note 55. at 51.

61. For the effectiveness of the threat to withhold Fund aid. see the stories on the attempt by Indonesia to
adopt a currency board, the opposition of the Fund, and the eventual dropping of the plan by President Suharto: see,
e.g., Bad Plan for hIdonesia, INT'L HERALD TRIB.. Feb. 19, 1998, at 8 ("Fortunately, the monetary fund has
threatened to cut offthe money if Mr. Suharto proceeds with his foolhardy idea."); Paul Handley, Not What Indonesia
Requires. INT'L HERALDTRIB., Feb. 20, 1998. at 8 ("The reforms were to be carried out in exchange for emergency
loans worth about $43 billion organized by the IMF."); Sander Thoenes, Suharto 'Drops His Currency Board Plans,'
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Fund conditionality, however, does not aid in the real purpose of the
development of international norms of best practice banking, accounting and
financial market supervision, that is, prevention of sovereign liquidity crises. There
is no customary international law obligation on emerging market nations to follow
whatever consensus develops on the best financial supervision practice;, the Fund
Agreement, as noted, in Article VI in its present form, assumes that countries will
meet capital outflows with capital controls. 2 Chairman Greenspan has called
publicly for "sufficient preventative measures in place" to ward off crisis number
three (Mexico being number one and Asia number two), 63 but such measures can
only be put in place by national governments. The Report of the Working Partyon
FinancialStability in Emerging Market Economies64 seems to believe that the
desire to be able to access the international capital markets will encourage countries
to adopt the standards. The Executive Summary of the Report lists as the Third
Component of the strategy to encourage the "adoption and implementation of sound
principles and practices needed for financial stability,... use of market discipline
and market access channels to provide incentives for the adoption of sound
supervisory systems, better corporate governance and other key elements of a robust
financial system."'6 "Once principles for sound practices have been established,
markets can provide important incentives for their adoption. For example, emerging
market economies that implement widely accepted norms will gain improved access
capital market and may obtain sizable reductions in funding
to the international
66
costs.",
This may be true, but one needs to ask where markets get their information. The
major international rating agencies did not downgrade the ratings for the public
debt of Korea, Thailand and Indonesia until considerably after the crises had
begun. It seems fair to say that whatever the agencies base their country analyses
on, it is surely not an in-depth study of the quality of banking supervision in
emerging markets. The global mutual funds are not a source of discipline; the aim
of any such fund when sentiment shifts is to be first out the door. It is at this point
that one must praise Morris Goldstein and his study, The Casefor an International
Banking Standard.7 Mr. Goldstein has recognized the insufficiency of leaving
compliance with international norms of supervision up to national regulations
without more ("Who's supervising the supervisors?") 6 and has made in his study

FIN. TIMES. Feb. 24. 1998. at 4 ("President Suharto's apparent reversal lifts the threat of the International Monetary
Fund canceling its $43 billion rescue package.").
62. The Fund Agreement,supra note 3, Art. VI, § 1(a). Without doubt the Fund will be working on amendment
ofArts. VI and VIII of the Agreement in the next several years. but the process of amendment of an international treaty
is glacial.
63. Supra note 58.
64. Supra note 55.
65.

REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY, supra note 55, at I.

66.
67.
68.

Id.
Goldstein, text accompanying supra note 50.
Id. at 59.
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a concrete suggestion for obtaining compliance 69 that strikes this author as
exemplary.
Goldstein's suggestion begins with a reference to an already existing
mechanism put in place by the Fund after the Mexican peso crises,7" the Special
Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS).7 ' The Mexican crisis brought home to the
Fund the lack of access by the capital markets to reliable governmental data and
it established a standard for the provision of countries' economic and financial data
to the public by countries seeking access to international capital markets. (The
Fund is also working towards completion of a General Data Dissemination Standard
to guide all its members.) The most interesting aspect of the SDDS, however, is not
the standard itself, but the system for trying to ensure that countries accessing the
capital markets actually adhere to the standard in their provision of information to
the markets. This is achieved by first, inviting subscription to the SDDS in early
April 1996 by a letter from the IMF's Managing Director to all IMF members and
Governors and secondly, by creating an electronic bulletin board listing subscribing
countries together with their metadata-information about subscribers, data and
their dissemination practices. There has been a transition period-from the opening
of subscription in April 1996 until December 31, 1998--during which a Fund
member may subscribe even if its dissemination practices do not fully meet the
standard. At the present time, 43 countries have been listed as subscribers. The plan
is to maintain the Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board (DSBB) and to not
remove subscribers
during the transition period "except for egregious
' 72
nonobservance.
The Fund then adds, "After the transition period, serious and persistent
nonobservance will be cause for removal. Procedures for removal, which could
involve a panel of independent experts and would require a decision by the IMF
Executive Board, will be elaborated fully during the transition period.",7 The
implication is, of course, that removal from the DSBB would entail the imposition
of a market premium on borrowing by the offending country.
This then is the basic structure suggested by Goldstein for ensuring that
countries do adhere to whatever norms of best supervisory practice are worked out
by the international consultative process. Once the norms are elaborated, he would
have the Fund (and possibly the World Bank) create a similar list of subscribers to

69. Id. at 55-59 (discussing "How Should Compliance with an IBS Be Monitored and Encouraged?").
70. Gianviti, supra note 13. at 779; Lichtenstein. supra note 12, at 197.
71. For full information about SDDS, see Inteniational Monetary Fund, Special Data Dissemination
Standard Oven'iew (visited June 30. 1998) <http:lldsbb.imf.orglAl/overview.htm.> (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
72. Id. As of this writing, the procedures for removal have not yet been elaborated.
73. Id.
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the international banking standard.74 Since the Fund regularly has teams in all
75
emerging market countries as part of its Article IV surveillance responsibilities,
Goldstein suggests that the teams could inspect the domestic banking supervision
mechanisms for compliance with the standard. Since subscription to the standard
would be voluntary (with the carrot being, presumably, a better rate for the
country's interbank borrowing and other access to the capital markets), the Fund
inspection of compliance could not be considered intrusive. Whether the subject is
arms control, atomic energy control of the disposal of uranium or best practice
banking supervision, inspection by an international agency is acceptable today in
the greater interest of nonproliferation, whether it be nuclear material or financial
instability.
There will, of course, be myriad details to be worked out, in particular, the
exact procedures for de-listing, the serious penalty for noncompliance. It is even
conceivable that there might have to be an appellate body created for
reconsideration of the decision to remove a subscriber from the list. As of this
writing, the detailed legalistic dispute resolution system of the World Trade
Organization, including an appellate body, seems to be working just fine. Why
should not the international monetary system benefit from novel ways to ensure
national compliance with international standards as well?

74. There is no reason why, once there was agreement on the best practice in oversight of domestic securities
markets, insurance supervision, and accounting standards, these standards could not be treated the same way.
75. Gianviti, supra note 13, at 778.
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